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Abstract
Episodic memory (memories of the personal past) and prospecting the future (anticipating events)
are often described as mental time travel (MTT). While most use this description metaphorically,
we argue that episodic memory may allow for MTT in at least some robust sense. While episodic
memory experiences may not allow us to literally travel through time, they do afford genuine
awareness of past-perceived events. This is in contrast to an alternative view on which episodic
memory experiences present past-perceived events as mere intentional contents. Hence, episodic
memory is a way of coming into experiential contact with, or being again aware of, what happened
in the past. We argue that episodic memory experiences depend on a causal-informational link
with the past events being remembered, and that, assuming direct realism about episodic memory
experiences, this link suffices for genuine awareness. Since there is no such link in future
prospection, a similar argument cannot be used to show that it also affords genuine awareness of
future events. Constructivist views of memory might challenge the idea of memory as genuine
awareness of remembered events. We explain how our view is consistent with both constructivist
and anti-causalist conceptions of memory. There is still room for an interpretation of episodic
memory as enabling genuine awareness of past events, even if it involves reconstruction.
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1 In what sense is there mental time travel?
Going back to his book Elements of Episodic Memory (1983), Endel Tulving de-
scribes episodic memory as enablingmental time travel. In a more recent article, he
says “When one thinks today about what one did yesterday, time’s arrow is bent
into a loop. The rememberer has mentally traveled back into her past” (2002, p. 2).
This colorful way of describing episodic memory has been widely adopted by both
scientists (e.g. Beaty, Seli, & Schacter, 2019) and philosophers (e.g. Michaelian,
2016b). Tulving is well aware that mental time travel does not really bend time’s
arrow: “An event happens […] memory traces are laid down […]. The memory
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traces […] are retrieved, and the person remembers the event. […] There is cer-
tainly no violation of any law of time” (Tulving, 2002, p. 19). This suggests that
talk of mental time travel (hereafter ‘MTT’) is just a catchy metaphor for an oth-
erwise straightforward psychological mechanism.1 Both scientists (Suddendorf &
Corballis, 2007) and philosophers (Byrne, 2010; Debus, 2014; Matthen, 2010) have
taken it this way. While MTT certainly is not literal time travel, we shall argue
here that it is more than mere metaphor.
The neuro-cognitive system behind episodic memory is generally taken to fa-
cilitate not only past recall but also prospecting the future (Beaty et al., 2019; Buck-
ner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving,
2002), imagining counterfactual ways the past could have gone (De Brigard, 2014),
and other forms of episodic simulation (Michaelian, 2016b ch. 6). Thus, we should
not talk about a dedicated episodic memory system, but a more general episodic
cognition system (Michaelian, 2016b, p. 105). Focusing on past recall and future
prospection, Tulving (2002, p. 20) has bundled all the activities of this episodic
cognition system under the MTT label, saying that “mental time travel involves
awareness not only of what has been but also of what may come”. Others use the
term in the same way. For example, De Brigard (2014, p. 174) says MTT refers “to
our psychological ability to mentally travel back in time […] and to project our-
selves onto the future”. Suddendorf and Corballis (2007, p. 299) say MTT refers “to
the faculty that allows humans to mentally project themselves backwards in time
to re-live, or forwards to pre-live, events”. Michaelian (2016b, p. 98) saysMTT “can
be directed both at the personal past and the personal future”. These theorists use
the term ‘mental time travel’ to refer to whatever people are doing as they recall
the past, imagine the future, and engage in other forms of episodic cognition.
There is nothing wrong with a catchy, metaphorical term like ‘mental time
travel.’2 Still, we will articulate an interesting and controversial way in which
episodicmemory actually affords something likeMTT in a non-metaphorical sense.
On this notion, an experience involves (something like) MTT if it not only presents
some event outside the present as a merely intentional content but also affords its
subject genuine awareness of that event. On this notion, the episodic cognition
system would enable MTT if the “re-experiencing” (Tulving, 2002, p. 6) of a past
event, or “pre-experiencing” (Michaelian, 2016b, p. 98) of a future event, involved
genuine awareness of the recalled or prospected event itself. It will take somework
to explain precisely what is meant by ‘genuine awareness’, but if past recall or
future prospection involve genuine awareness of the recalled or prospected event
itself, then the subject of the recall or prospection experience is in a special sort
of contact with that event. The event is “brought into consciousness”, as we might
1Throughout this paper we adopt the philosophical convention of using single quotes to mention
a term. We use double quotes for direct quotations of other texts and as scare quotes.
2Debus (2014, p. 335) suggests that the point of this terminology within psychology is to emphasize
the underlying psychological and neurobiological similarities between past recall, future prospec-
tion, and other forms of episodic simulation.
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put it. So, while MTT (in this sense) does not involve the literal transposition
of your physical body to spacetimes outside the present, it does involve bringing
“into mind” events outside the present.
With this substantive notion of MTT in hand, it becomes an open question
whether either past recall or future prospection amount to MTT. It is helpful to
distinguish between the episodic cognition system – the set of neural mechanisms
and the computations they implement – and the abilities and mental states it en-
ables. It is possible that some, but not all, of these states count as MTT in our
substantive sense. Thus, the question is not whether the episodic cognition system
enables MTT, broadly speaking, but which, if any, of the states it enables count as
MTT.
We argue that the past recall enabled by the episodic cognition system is, in
fact, MTT in our sense, but that the future prospection enabled by the system is not.
Specially, we shall argue that episodic memory experiences (recall experiences, for
short) involve genuine awareness of the past-perceived events being remembered,
while prospection experiences present imagined future events as mere intentional
contents. The argument turns on the neurobiology of memory as involving mem-
ory traces which provide a causal-informational link to the past recalled events;
the lack of such links in future prospection is what keeps it from also being MTT.
So, the episodic cognition system enables MTT in one direction (past) but not the
other (future), because only its past-directed states make contact with events out-
side the present.
In the following, section 2 lays out three possible ways to understand the claim
that episodic cognition enables MTT. These are uninteresting, as nearly everyone
will accept these senses of MTT. Section 3 articulates the notion ofMTT as genuine
awareness and explains how it involves bringing events outside the present into
consciousness. After the main argument from causal-informational links in sec-
tion 4, sections 5-7 consider to what extent the constructive nature of the episodic
cognition system undercuts the case for past recall involving genuine awareness.
2 Three preliminary notions of MTT
Applying standard concepts from the philosophy ofmind, we get three preliminary
notions of MTT:
1. MTT as representation of the past/future: The claim that the episodic
cognition system enables MTT could be a claim about the representational
content of the states we are in as we recall the past or prospect the future.
According to this claim, the accuracy of your current recalled memory or
future prospection is determined by comparing what it represents to some
past or future episode. In this sense, episodic cognition would enable MTT
if it enabled representing something as outside the present.
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2. MTT as phenomenal similarity with past/future experiences: The
claim that the episodic cognition system enables MTT could be a claim
about the phenomenology of the states we are in as we recall the past or
prospect the future. According to this claim, what it is like (Nagel, 1974)
to remember some episode from the past or imagine oneself in the future
is the same as (or matches in some key respects) what that episode was
initially, or will be, like for you. In this sense, episodic cognition would
enable MTT if it enabled repeating (or repeating in relevant respects) some
past experience or preempting a future one.3
3. MTT as the lack of phenomenal presence: The claim that the episodic
cognition system enablesMTT could be a claim about the lack of phenomenal
presence felt towards what is experienced as we recall the past and prospect
the future. According to this claim, the phenomenology of these states is
such that you experience the recalled or prospected events not as present
here and now, but as past or future in another place. In this sense, episodic
cognition would enable mental time travel if it enabled experience which
introspectively seems to you to be experience of the past or future.
It is widely accepted that the episodic cognition system enables MTT in sense (1),
i.e. that it provides representations of the past and future (e.g. Michaelian, 2016b).
The mental states you are in as you prospect the future or remember the past can
fail to match their target future or past events; so, they have veridicality conditions
which involve the future or past and hence are representations of the future or past
on most definitions of ‘representation’ (e.g. Burge, 2010, p. 292). All this still holds
even if it is not the function of the episodic cognition system to produce accurate
representations (De Brigard, 2014).4
Similarly, most will accept that the episodic cognition system enables MTT in
sense (2). Recalling the past or imagining the future has phenomenal similarity
with the recalled past or imagined future experience.5 This is presumably what
Tulving means when he says that episodic memory “allows people to consciously
3If you are a strong representationalist who thinks that representational content determines phe-
nomenology, and the states we are in as we recall the past or prospect the future match (at least
some of) the content of the remembered or prospected perceptual states, then (1) entails (2). Simi-
larly, on certain views about the relationship between phenomenology and representational con-
tent, (2) entails (1). But these are all substantive views and as a conceptual matter (1) and (2) are
independent notions of MTT.
4A naïve realist like Debus (2008), or those inclined to something like Noë’s (2004) sensorimotor
enactivism, may take issue with the claim that past recall and future prospection involve represen-
tation. But as has been discussed in the philosophy of perception literature (see Siegel, 2010 ch. 2),
there is no reason why a naïve realist cannot in principle accept that these experiences have con-
tent. More recently, Sant’Anna and Michaelian (2019, p. 198), adapting an argument from Travis
(2004), argue that states of the episodic cognition system leave their contents indeterminate, and
hence presumably lack representational content. If correct, this would mean these states are not
representations at all.
5Martin (2001, p. 273) might be an example of someone who denies this claim. Matthen (2010)
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re-experience past experiences” (Tulving, 2002, p. 6). Although the vividness
with which people “re-experience” the past (or “pre-experience” the future) varies
(Beaty et al., 2019), it is generally accepted that past recall and future prospec-
tion involve phenomenal experience.6 This experience, although perhaps fainter,
matches the target past or future experience to some extent. For example, what it
is like for you as you recall eating breakfast is, at least in some respects, what it
was like for you to eat breakfast (Debus, 2014; Matthen, 2010). What it is like to
imagine the color green being similar but fainter than what it is like to see green
(Hume, 1777/1993, p. 10) is a reasonable analogy; the mental image is similar to
the percept.
It is fairly trivial that, at least most of the time, the episodic cognition system
enables MTT in sense (3). Past recall and future prospection lack phenomenal
presence (Martin, 2001, p. 273). We do not normally confuse our recalled episodic
memories for perception of the here and now (Tulving, 2002, p. 2) and likewise for
our future prospections, although there have been cases of relaxed mindfulness
being confused for hallucination in simple experimental conditions of sensory de-
privation (Foulkes & Fleisher, 1975). Past recall and future prospection do not,
introspectively, seem to us to be experience of the here and now. We have, as
Tulving puts it, “autonoetic consciousness” (Tulving, 1983): we are aware of our
recall and prospection experiences as experiences of the past and future (Perrin,
2016, p. 45). While autonoeticity does not entail a lack of phenomenal presence,
it would be hard to explain if recall and prospection experiences had phenomenal
presence.
3 MTT as genuine awareness
The above three notions of MTT are all metaphorical. We shall argue, however,
that the episodic cognition system enables MTT in recall but not prospection ex-
periences in the following sense:
4. MTT as genuine awareness of the past: The episodic cognition system
enables MTT in the sense that it enables experiences which afford genuine
awareness of past events.
Explaining what is meant by ‘genuine awareness’ will take some work. We need
to start with some preliminary ground clearing. As we shall explain, this sense of
MTT as genuine awareness of the past, while not literal time travel, goes beyond
mere metaphor.
emphasizes the phenomenal differences between recalling an event and the original experience,
but this is consistent with much similarity.
6This experience is often called ‘mental imagery’ (e.g. Martin & Deutscher, 1966; Beaty et al., 2019),
although we mostly avoid this term because it is naturally read as presupposing an indirect realist
account of recall and prospection experiences.
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3.1 Direct realism
There is something it is like to recall an event. As is often said, this episodic recall
involves “re-experiencing” the event or “re-living” the original experience. If this
recall is MTT in sense (4), then this (re-)experience is an experience of the past
event that is being recalled.
Experiencing past events themselves, as opposed to (say) mental images of
those events, implies direct realism. Direct realism is the view that we experience
the mind-independent world itself, not intermediary mind-dependent objects like
mental images or mental representations. In contrast, indirect realism, which
involves something akin to mental images, does not allow for MTT in the sense
being articulated here.
There are two ways to be a direct realist in the philosophical literature on per-
ception (Crane, 2006). Naïve realism (e.g. Campbell, 2002; Fish, 2009; Martin, 2004),
sometimes called relationalism, can be characterized several ways (see Genone,
2016). Put simply it holds that perceptual experiences are relations of awareness to
distal sensory stimuli that are unmediated by representations. Representationalism
holds that while we experience distal sensory stimuli themselves, that experience
is a form of, or grounded in, representations of those stimuli (e.g. Dretske, 1995;
Burge, 2010; Speaks, 2015).
Representationalism at first glance seems to not be direct realism. After all, rep-
resentationalists either take experiences to be, as a matter of metaphysical nature,
relations to mental representations (e.g. Sant’Anna, 2020), or simply take them
to be mental representations (e.g. Dretske, 2003). But within the philosophical
literature on perception, many representationalists take themselves to be direct
realists. Dretske (2003, p. 73) says that “seeing a tree [for example] is not to be
understood as awareness of some mental intermediary (an image, a sense-datum)
having the properties the tree appears to have”, but rather as awareness of a tree.
Clark agrees:
The kinds of mechanism I have sketched provide a means by which an
agent may come to perceive the world. They do not, for example, pro-
vide a means by which an agent comes to perceive her own internal
representations of the world. For what is perceived are not represen-
tations but the world. (Clark, 2012, p. 767)
What is going on? The key is to distinguish between two kinds of directness. Rus-
sell (1912/1997), and later Jackson (1977), famously describe the first kind (see also
Genone, 2016, pp. 2–3). On this notion of directness, you directly perceives a distal
sensory stimulus if and only if you do not perceive it by experiencing something
else, like a mental image or sense-datum. The second notion of directness refers to
metaphysical nature. Perception is direct if and only if it does not depend on some
other state, like the tokening of a mental representation. Representationalism – as
understood by philosophers of perception like Dretske (2003), Burge (2010), Clark
(2012), and many others – makes perceptual experience direct in the first sense,
but not the second.
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Under this version of representationalism, we perceive a distal sensory stimu-
lus when we are in a certain kind of mental state which represents that stimulus.
But what we experience while in that state is not the state (i.e., the representation)
itself. What we experience is what is represented by that state: the distal sensory
stimulus. As Crane (2006, p. 136) explains, the experience itself (i.e., the state of
the subject) might be a representation, but what is experienced by the subject in
that state is what is represented by it (see also Bernecker, 2008 ch. 5-6). As Dretske
(2003) stresses, the distinction between representational vehicles and representa-
tional contents is important: the state itself is a representational vehicle, but that
vehicle’s (wide) content is what is experienced.
Relating this to memory (Michaelian, 2016b, pp. 62–65), while some mem-
ory theorists are naïve realists (e.g. Debus, 2008), others are representationalists
(e.g. Martin, 2001; Bernecker, 2008). Memory representationalists hold that states
of recall are representations (i.e., representational vehicles) of the remembered
event, but allow that the (re-)experiences accompanying these states are experi-
ences of the represented past event (i.e., of that vehicle’s content). Naïve realists
about memory deny that states of recall are representations, saying instead they
are metaphysically direct relations of awareness to the past. For both views, dur-
ing recall, what we experience are recalled events themselves, not representations
of them or some other mental intermediary. A representationalist about episodic
memory who wanted to emphasize the metaphysical nature of recall experiences
might say that their view is a version of indirect realism. Michaelian (2016b, p. 65)
uses this terminology, calling memory representationalists like Bernecker (2008)
‘moderate indirect realists,’7 although Bernecker rejects this terminology. Given
that there are two notions of directness at play, one can use the terminology of
‘direct realism’ and ‘indirect realism’ with an eye towards either. We follow the
philosophy of perception literature and call all these views ‘direct realist’, since we
emphasize what recall experiences make us aware of.
Nothing stops representationalists from endorsing indirect realism in both
senses. Under this view, influentially defended by Jackson (1977) and still found in
much of the literature on episodic memory, what we experience when perceiving
or remembering are representations. For example, Sant’Anna and Michaelian
(2019, p. 197) write “According to representationalism, when we engage in
episodic hypothetical thought, the direct objects of our mental states are internal
representations of events”. Within visual experiences, these representations
might be thought of as mental pictures, mental images, or percepts. We will call
this version ‘indirect representationalism’ and use the term ‘direct representation-
alism’ for the version of representationalism described above (and endorsed by
Dretske, 2003; Bernecker, 2008; Clark, 2012 among others).
7Elsewhere, Sant’Anna and Michaelian (2019, p. 190) define ‘direct realism’ to be the view we
are here calling naïve realism (aka relationalism), i.e. the view that experiences are relations of
direct awareness to distal sensory stimuli (like ordinary objects). They also (2019, p. 197) refer to
“indirect realism or representationalism”, equating the two. Contrast this with Genone (2016, p.
6), who says that to get naïve realism one needs to add further claims to direct realism (e.g., the
claim that awareness does not depend on the tokening of a mental representation).
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Contemporary philosophers of perception have largely abandoned indirect rep-
resentationalism because it was initially motivated by the need to explain halluci-
nation and illusion, phenomena which can be handled by direct representation-
alism. As Genone (2016, p. 6) notes, illusory and hallucinatory experiences can
be accounted for “without invoking sense-data or other mediating mental objects.
In this respect, representationalism is consistent with direct realism, and can be
thought of as one way of developing its central claims.” Indirect representational-
ism is not needed to account for such cases.
Consider the traditional problem of hallucination for direct realism.8 The prob-
lem supposes that a given successful perceptual experience could, counterfactu-
ally, have been a hallucination. Since the experience is the same either way (so
the problem assumes), you would be aware of the same thing in both cases. But
the counterfactual scenario involves no distal object for you to be aware of, and
since the cases are phenomenally indistinguishable, in the actual successful per-
ceptual experience, you are not aware of the seen object itself either. A similar
problem arises for direct realism about memory (Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019).
False memories or confabulations, like perceptual hallucinations, allow for a par-
allel track of reasoning against the conclusion that we are aware of remembered
events themselves. You could reply that “the direct objects of memory, both in
cases of successful remembering and in cases of unsuccessful remembering, are
internal representations” (Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019, p. 194).9 Indirect repre-
sentationalists about perception, like Jackson (1977), would have likewise said that
the “objects” of perceptual experience (what we experience) are internal represen-
tations.
But as noted by Dretske (2003), Bernecker (2008), Genone (2016) and others,
direct representationalism is able to handle this problem while saving direct real-
ism. In both the good and bad case (of either perception or memory), what we
experience is indeed the same. In both hallucinating and perceiving, according to
the direct representationalist, you are in a state which represents some distal ob-
ject. What you experience is the same, but there is an important difference. What
is represented in the good case is an actual perceived or remembered stimulus. In
the bad case, there is nothing out in the world which is represented by the (hallu-
cinatory or confabulatory) experience. Imagine you snap a digital photo of your
desk. Counterfactually, if you did not have a desk like that, you could have in-
stead made a digital image from scratch which matches the photo pixel-for-pixel.
In both cases, what is represented is the same: a certain desk. But in the one case
this representation is satisfied; that is, it refers to an actual item out in the world. In
8This brief discussion is merely intended to be illustrative. For a more exhaustive discussion, with
an eye towards memory in particular, see (Bernecker, 2008 ch. 5-6).
9This is not the view which Sant’Anna and Michaelian endorse in their paper (2019). Instead, they
develop an innovative pragmatist approach to the objects of memory, prospection, and other
counterfactual-imaginative experiences. They simply suggest this as the representationalist re-
sponse to the problem of hallucination and confabulation.
Barkasi, M., & Rosen, M. G. (2020). Is mental time travel real time travel? Philosophy and the Mind
Sciences, 1(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.1.28
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Is mental time travel real time travel? 9
the other case the representation is unsatisfied or remainsmerely intentional; there
is no actual item to which it refers. Experiences, according to the direct represen-
tationalist, are the same: sometimes they are satisfied by, or refer to, actual things
out in the world, other times not.10 A perceptual experience and a matching hal-
lucination can, in one sense, have the same object, while in another sense having
different objects. The object of the experience in both cases is what is represented,
but only in the good case of perception or memory is that representational content
satisfied by something out in the world.
3.2 Recall as genuine awareness
The upshot of this preliminary ground clearing is that our thesis should not be re-
jected out of hand simply because it presupposes direct realism. The claim that we
are, in recall experiences, genuinely aware of the recalled events themselves only
presupposes direct realism in a weak sense. It only presupposes that we do not ex-
perience recalled events in virtue of experiencing some mental intermediary. It does
not presuppose whether or not our recall experiences are mediated, or enabled,
by intermediary representational states. More importantly, both the naïve realist
and the direct representationalist about recall experiences can endorse our thesis.
By entailing direct realism, our thesis does not automatically become a version of
naïve realism about memory experience (e.g., like Debus, 2008).
Our thesis is also not merely a restatement of direct realism. For the moment,
set aside naïve realism (about perception or memory). Consider the difference
between veridical perception and perceptual hallucinations, along with the direct
10We are setting aside a number of important complications, such as the particularity of experience,
for simplicity of exposition. According to the dominant account in the literature, prominently
developed by Dretske (2003), Burge (2005) and Matthen (2005), experiences are a kind of indexi-
cal, or demonstrative, representation. For example, if you see a yellow pencil, you are in a state
with the content X is yellow and a pencil, where the open slot X is filled in contextually by the
actual object with which you are causally interacting through your visual system. When you
successfully perceive a yellow pencil, this slot is filled by the actual pencil you are looking at,
and hence the particular token of the visual state you are in comes to represent that particular
pencil. When you merely hallucinate a yellow pencil, this slot remains empty, because there is
no object with which you are interacting through your visual system. While this does mean that
the representational content of the two tokens (the good perceptual token and the bad hallucina-
tory token) of the visual state differ in their overall representational content, the two tokens still
share the (narrow) content fixed by the state type, the content that there is a yellow pencil. Direct
representationalists like Dretske, Burge, and Matthen say this is enough to explain the phenom-
enal similarity between the good the bad cases, as the particular object itself represented by the
experience does not affect the phenomenology. Only the general or property-level content that
is shared across experience tokens affects phenomeonology. Schellenberg (2011) develops this
approach using “gappy” Fregean modes of presentation. Sant’Anna (2020) adapts Schellenberg’s
approach to the case of memory. There is much debate over whether an account like this can ex-
plain all aspects of perceptual experience and the related problems associated with hallucination
and illusion. But it is widely thought by direct representationalists that some explanation, along
the lines sketched here, provides the tools for saving direct realism from such problems.
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representationalist explanation of each just discussed above. If you visually hal-
lucinate a pencil, then a pencil is what you experience while hallucinating. The
direct representationalist says that your hallucinatory experience is a representa-
tion of a pencil. You experience a pencil because that is what is represented by the
experience. But this content of the hallucinatory experience is merely intentional,
i.e. unsatisfied. There is no particular pencil out in the world which is represented.
Now contrast what the direct representationalist says about hallucinating a
pencil with what they say about seeing a pencil. If you have a successful visual
experience of some actual pencil in your environment, your visual experience rep-
resents a pencil, just as the hallucination did. But what it represents is an actual
object out in the world: the pencil that is stimulating your photoreceptors. Thus,
the content of this representation (the content of your perceptual experience) is
not merely intentional (Martin, 2001, p. 275). What you experience is an actual
object out in the world. As we will say, your visual perceptual experience affords
you genuine awareness of this pencil.
So, even if recall experiences are experiences of the recalled events themselves
(direct realism), there is still an open question of whether they are more like the
case of perception or the case of perceptual hallucination. As you episodically
recall some past-perceived event, is what you experience a mere intentional con-
tent, or do you instead actually experience the event? When we say that recall
experiences afford genuine awareness of recalled events, we mean that they are
experiences in the latter sense. Our talk of ‘genuine awareness’ is meant to cap-
ture that recall experiences do not merely make subjects aware of recalled events
as mere intentional contents.
It may seem that this distinction applies to perception but not to recall experi-
ences. At first glance, what seems to make the content of a perceptual hallucina-
tion merely intentional is that there is no distal sensory stimulus out in the world
to be experienced. In contrast, what is recalled in successful recall experiences
are actual past-perceived events. Hence, if the recall experience is successful and
represents some actual past-perceived event, would not the content of that expe-
rience necessarily be satisfied, and so not “merely intentional”? This move is too
fast. Consider how you can hallucinate real objects. For example, you can visually
hallucinate your favorite pencil when it is nowhere near you to be seen. In this
case, what you experience (your favorite pencil) is a merely intentional content,
even though that content represents an actual thing out in the world (assuming
you have a favorite pencil).
What makes the difference between genuine awareness and experiencing a
mere intentional content is a certain kind of contact between subject and thing
experienced. A hallucination of your favorite pencil is an experience of a mere
intentional content, and not that pencil itself, because the experience fails to ac-
tually put you in contact with it. Genuine awareness of a distal sensory stimulus
happens when perceptual experience “brings” that stimulus “into consciousness.”11
11Debus (2014 footnote 12) draws a similar distinction. What we have called ‘genuine awareness’
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Keep in mind that this notion of genuine awareness is perfectly compatible with
direct representationalism. Indeed, direct representationalists about perceptual ex-
perience see themselves precisely as giving an account of how the senses manage
to bring into mind distal stimuli. For example, here is Clark again discussing his
predictive-processing representationalist view of perceptual experience:12
Considered in this way, the mechanistic story on offer simply shows
how beings like us are able to achieve genuine access to the causal
structure of our environment. They show, asmy colleagueMattNudds
once put it to me, how it is that we can be “open to the world”. […]
Equippedwith brains like ours we become porous to the world. (Clark,
2012, p. 767)
For the direct representationalist, we bring distal stimuli “into mind”, or “into con-
sciousness”, by representing them in the right way. A hallucinatory experience of
(or rather: “as of”) your favorite pencil, although representing it, does not put you
in the sort of representational contact necessary for genuine awareness.
The question then becomes whether recall experiences (at least the successful
ones not based on false memories) afford genuine awareness, or whether instead
(like perceptual hallucinations) they involve experience of mere intentional con-
tents. We argue in the next section that recall experiences (when successful) afford
genuine awareness.
So far, we have focused on direct representationalist accounts. As noted above,
Debus (2008) argues for a naïve realist (or as she calls it, relationalist) account of
memory in which recall experiences are direct relations to the recalled event. Re-
call, in this view, involves not only (as we are calling it) genuine awareness of
some past event, but also that awareness itself has the metaphysical structure of
a relation. Episodically remembering a past event is just a way to be related to it.
Our thesis, that recall experiences involve genuine awareness, is entailed by, but
is weaker than, this view. We are not arguing for naïve realism (i.e., relationalism)
and having genuine awareness of past objects through memory does not require
it. While we agree with Debus that memory (when successful) allows us genuine
awareness of past events, we leave open the metaphysical nature of this aware-
ness. In our view, recall experiences could be representational states in which
(following the direct representationalist account outlined just above) the subject
experiences what is represented. The arguments we give in the next section for
our claim are also different from those given by Debus. Debus (2008) gives (a) a
positive argument which parallels Campbell’s (2002) claim that naïve realism is
necessary to see how perception (or, in Debus’ case, memory) affords understand-
is what Debus describes as factive experiential awareness, while what we have called ‘experience
of a mere intentional content’ is what Debus describes as experience “as of” an object.
12The naïve realist might object that, because of the similarities (on the direct representationalist
account) between perception and the hallucination, the perceptual experiences do not really (on
the direct representationalist account) put one in contact with distal stimuli (e.g., see Fish, 2009,
p. 14). We are not here to adjudicate this dispute.
Barkasi, M., & Rosen, M. G. (2020). Is mental time travel real time travel? Philosophy and the Mind
Sciences, 1(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.1.28
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Michael Barkasi and Melanie G. Rosen 12
ing and knowledge of demonstrative claims, and (b) various replies to the typical
objections made to naïve realism. Our arguments, for the weaker claim that recall
experience involves genuine awareness, will instead focus on the causal structure
of memory.
If we are right that successful recall experiences involve genuine awareness of
past-perceived events, why does this amount to MTT in a way that goes beyond
meremetaphor? Themain idea is that genuine awareness of a past-perceived event
would entail that that past event is “brought into consciousness” (as we might
put it), or (alternatively put) that our state of recall extends back into the past to
include that event. To borrow some evocative language from the naïve realists,
when you make experiential contact with the world, the world itself “shape[s]
the contours” of your experience (Martin, 2004, p. 64); there is “an incursion or
intrusion of the objective within the nonobjective – of ‘brute’ nonconscious matter
within conscious life” (Hellie, 2014, p. 247). As Debus (2008, p. 418) says, your
“point of view extends over” the part of the world of which you are conscious.
This metaphorical talk of “bringing” a past event “into consciousness”, or a mental
state “extending” over the past event can be cashed out in terms of constitution.
It is often assumed within philosophy of mind that experiences are constituted (at
least in part) by the things of which they make us aware.13 Specifically: what it
is like for you to have an experience just is (at least in part) what the experienced
thing is like. For example, if you were asked what it is like to visually experience a
pencil, all you could really do is describe the pencil you see. So, what an experience
makes you aware of becomes a constitutive part of the experience.
This term ‘constitutive part’ raises some subtle issues. As noted by Fish (2009,
pp. 10–11), the idea that what we experience is a constitutive part of our expe-
riences has been endorsed by both direct representationalists like Dretske (2003),
Tye (1995), and Lycan (2001), as well as by naïve realists like Fish himself (2009)
and Martin (2004). When naïve realists (including Debus) make this claim, they
are claiming that the experience is a state of a type which necessarily involves
the object or event experienced. When direct representationalists make the claim,
they of course need to allow that any given experience is of a type which can
be instanced even without the object or event that is being represented.14 Hence
the constitution claim, on their view, should be taken as a claim about experience
tokens, not types. Say you successfully perceive, or successfully remember perceiv-
ing, some distal object or event. While the distal object or event is not necessary
for having another experience of the same type, and hence is not a constituent
part of the experience type, it is a constituent part of the particular token instance
of that type which you enjoy as you perceive it.
13When you add in the qualifier ‘at least in part’ (as we have done here), the claim should be
amenable even to qualia theorists who think there are some properties of experience not identi-
fiable with properties of what is experienced.
14In contrast, since naïve realists aremostly all disjunctivists, the issue of hallucination doesn’t arise
from them. They say that when I have an experience of an object, that experience type includes
that particular object as a constituent part. Since the experience is of a type that constitutively
involves the object perceived, that experience type can’t be reproduced in a hallucination.
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To summarize: if recall experiences afford genuine awareness of past events
instead of simply presenting those past events as mere intentional contents, then
they put us in contact with the past itself. The recalled event itself literally shows
up within our experience, as a constituent part. While this does not amount
to literal travel through time, it certainly makes talk of MTT more than mere
metaphor.15
4 Does episodic cognition enable genuine
awareness of the past?
We noted above that direct realism about recall experiences actually leaves open
two possibilities: successful recall experiences could afford genuine awareness of
what is recalled, or instead their contents could be merely intentional. The aim of
this section is to argue for the first possibility, assuming direct realism. If a naïve
realist account of memory like Debus’ is true, then successful recall experiences
(i.e., ones which involve recalling actual past-perceived events) will necessarily
involve genuine awareness of the recalled events. Experiences with merely inten-
tional content are only possible for direct representationalists because, for them,
awareness is mediated by representations. It is possible to represent something
that is not really there, or with which you are not really in contact, and so it is
possible to have an experience that does not put you into contact with anything.
Since the naïve realist denies that awareness is mediated by representations, you
are aware of something only if there exists some actual distal object or event of
which you are aware. So, if a naïve realist account of (successful) recall experiences
is correct, it follows immediately that episodic cognition enables genuine aware-
ness of the past. Hence, any arguments for a naïve realist account are arguments
for the claim that episodic cognition enables genuine awareness of the past.
Debus (2008) is one of the few theorists who have defended a naïve realist ac-
count of recall experiences.16 She also argues (2014) that a similar account will not
work for the experiences involved in future prospection. Her reasoning is straight-
forward: since future events are not yet actual, it is not possible to be genuinely
aware of them. A similar, parallel worry can be raised for naïve realism about
episodic memory: you might think past events no longer exist, and if not, you
could not be conscious of them in a recall experience (Michaelian, 2016b; Moran,
2019; Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019). Note that the same problem will arise for
the proposal that recall experiences involve genuine awareness of the past, even if
15We want to thank a reviewer for pressing us to clarify our claim that recall experiences involve
MTT in some non-metaphorical sense. As they helpfully summarized our view, “the subject
just ‘reaches out’ to the past mentally, from the here and now in which she remains mentally
anchored”.
16Debus, in her (2014) account, does not notice that her account entails a sense in which episodic
memory is more than mere metaphor. She takes the MTT talk to be purely metaphorical.
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it is developed within the direct representationalist framework. If past events do
not exist, then we cannot be genuinely aware of them, as that awareness entails
their constitutive involvement in the (at least token) experience.
We want to set aside both naïve realism and this metaphysical problem. Since
naïve realism is highly controversial (and not necessary for our thesis), it is more
interesting to ask whether arguments for our thesis can be given independently of
arguments for naïve realism. The metaphysical problem rests on deep questions
about whether past objects and events really exist, questions which are outside
the scope of this paper.17 While a final, definitive analysis of the issue will, of
course, require some discussion of these metaphysical issues, we are instead more
interested in pressing the discussion from the standpoint of empirical psychology
and neuroscience. The interesting question, as we see it, is whether there is a case
to be made, on the basis of the psychological facts, for or against the claim that
recall experiences involve genuine awareness of the past.
At first blush, there is a case to be made for the claim that recall experiences in-
volve genuine awareness of the past. To start, consider the cases of perception and
perceptual hallucination and what makes perception (but not hallucination) a case
of genuine awareness. Roughly, perception and hallucination are distinguished by
the involvement of causal-informational links in the former. The reason a hallu-
cinatory experience of your favorite pencil is merely “as of” that pencil and fails
to make you genuinely aware of it is that your sensory systems are not interact-
ing with it. There is no concurrent causal connection or information-carrying link
between the pencil and your (hallucinatory) experience as there is when you per-
ceive it. In perception your sensory systems interact with your favorite pencil in a
way that couples your experience to it (Chisholm, 1957, p. 149): what it is like for
you as you perceive it depends on what it is like at present, as you interact with it
through your sensory systems.
Now, it is plausible that this sensory interaction is what distinguishes percep-
tual experiences with mere intentional content (i.e., hallucinations) from success-
ful perceptual experiences that afford genuine awareness of the distal world. If a
perceptual experience of an object is generated via sensory interaction with that
object so that the experience is coupled to the object, then it yields genuine aware-
ness.18 The recall experiences of episodic memory are not perceptual experiences,
but they still satisfy this condition. They are (at least when successful) generated
by an information-carrying sensory interaction with the recalled event via mem-
ory traces. For example, what it is like for you as you recall eating breakfast this
morning depends on what that event was in fact like as you interacted with the
meal through your sensory systems.
17Michaelian (2016b, p. 63), Sant’Anna and Michaelian (2019, p. 191), and Moran (2019) say that
the view that past or future objects really exist (eternalism) is highly unintuitive, but at least one
author of this paper disagrees.
18The qualifier that the experience is of the object is important. We are not suggesting that a causal
link or coupling is sufficient for an experience to be of an object, only that if an experience is of
an object and is causally coupled to that object, then it affords genuine awareness.
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The causal theory of memory accepts as a basic premise that episodic mem-
ory involves this causal-informational link to the recalled events (e.g. Martin &
Deutscher, 1966; Bernecker, 2008). It also is supported by the neurobiology of
memory (Debus, 2008, p. 411). During an initial sensory interaction, reciprocating
patterns of neural activity cycle through sensory cortex and other related neural
circuits. These patterns of activity tune synaptic connections between neurons
via synaptic plasticity. This tuning primes the circuit to repeat the patterns when
and if they are later partially reformed by other neural input, whether that input
is stimulus-driven or top-down from extraperceptual processing (Feldman, 2012;
Jackson, 2013; Zylberberg & Strowbridge, 2017). This priming facilitates episodic
memory: episodic memories are recalled when partial inputs prompt the comple-
tion of activity patterns from previous sensory interactions (Brogaard & Gatzia,
2017, p. 9). The distributed effect of the synaptic tuning from the original pat-
tern (which primes the circuit to repeat it) is the memory trace which is so of-
ten discussed in theorizing about memory (Liu, Ramirez, Redondo, & Tonegawa,
2014, p. 59).
We can summarize the argument for genuine awareness of the past in episodic
memory as follows:
P1. Recall experiences of the past depend on the neural patterns reactivated in the
recall.
P2. These neural activity patterns depend on the synaptic tuning which primed
the neural circuit to repeat them.
P3. This synaptic tuning depends on the original pattern of activity which
shaped it.
P4. That original pattern of activity was due to a particular past sensory interac-
tion with particular objects in a particular event.
Conclusion 1: Recall experiences of the past depend on these particular objects
and events and what those objects and events were like.
P5. If a recall experience of the past is of a past-perceived event and causally de-
pends on that event and what it was like, then that experience involves gen-
uine awareness of the event itself.19
19It might be objected that just because what it is like to recall the past depends on a particular event
does not mean that what it is like to recall the past just is what that event was like. This is correct.
But P5 is not meant as a conceptual truth. P5 is motivated by noticing that it is the dependence of
perceptual experiences on the perceived object itself, via a causal-informational link, which seems
to make the difference between them and hallucination. So long as the dependence of a recall
experience on its past target is sufficiently like the dependence of a perceptual experience on its
target, we can infer that both recall experiences and perceptual experiences involve the same kind
of awareness: genuine awareness. Note that this is not a move from causal dependence to the
claim that experience is a simple, nonrepresentational relation to its object. Rather, the premise
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P6. Recall experiences of the past are of past-perceived events.
Conclusion 2: The recall experiences of the past that occur in episodic memory
involve genuine awareness of the remembered events themselves.
Note that this argument runs independently of whether we assume direct repre-
sentationalism or naïve realism. P1-4 capture the neurobiological facts underlying
past recall, while P5 gives a sufficient condition for genuine awareness which both
direct representationalists and naïve realists can accept. P6 is just direct realism
about recall experiences.
It is important to reiterate that P1-4 assume successful recall. Many times,
when we recall episodic memories, the resulting recall, or perhaps the whole mem-
ory trace itself, is distorted to the point of fabrication. Similar to how we can hal-
lucinate and seem to perceive what is not there, we can misremember and seem
to remember what did not happen. In that case, it is clear that our defective recall
experience of the past does not depend on the particular items being remembered.
In these cases, the recall experience’s content is merely intentional and does not af-
ford genuine awareness of any past event.20 Presumably, in these cases the causal-
information link discussed in P1-4 will itself be defective. So nothing about this
argument, or our position, entails that episodic recall is always accurate or always
affords genuine awareness of the past. Just as perceptual experiences, such as hal-
lucinations, can fail to afford genuine awareness of distal sensory stimuli, episodic
recall will likewise fail to afford genuine awareness of recalled events when things
go wrong.
As we noted above, we are restricting our claim to recall experiences, not all
experiences generated by the episodic cognition system. This is because you can-
not run a similar argument for future prospection. There is no analogous causal-
informational link to the future (Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019, p. 193). Presum-
ably, prospection experiences have only merely intentional content. They do not
afford us genuine awareness of the future, i.e. they do not put us into experiential
contact with the future. So, if this argument is successful, then there is an asymme-
try between past recall and future prospection: one puts us in experiential contact
with times outside the present while the other does not. Debus (2014) notices this
potential asymmetry, although she takes the further step of inferring that because
past recall but not future prospection involves experiential contact with events
outside the present, the two are different kinds of mental states. Similarly, Perrin
(2016, pp. 50–51) lands on a direct representationalist account of recall experiences
moves from the causal dependence of the memory on the remembered event and the memory
being an experience of that event to the memory being a certain kind of experience: the kind that
affords genuine awareness of its object. Memory as genuine awareness of the past does not entail
naïve realism (relationalism).
20At least, this is what a direct representationalist about memory would say. The naïve realist will
have to give a disjunctive account which treats these unsuccessful cases of memory as fundamen-
tally different from the successful cases.
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as involving (as we are calling it) genuine awareness of the past while prospection
experiences involve awareness of the future only in the sense of having future
events as mere intentional contents.21 From this asymmetry (as well as others),
he argues that past recall and future prospection are facilitated by different cogni-
tive processes. We do not think this inference follows. The above argument is not
intended to support any claims about past recall and future prospection being dif-
ferent kinds of states or being facilitated by different kinds of cognitive processes.
Consider successful perception and hallucination. According to direct representa-
tionalism, the former involves genuine awareness while the latter only involves
experiences with merely intentional contents. But according to direct represen-
tationalism, the two are not different kinds of states nor supported by different
systems. Since our argument and conclusion are consistent with direct represen-
tationalism about recall experiences, disjunctivism is not implied.
It is worth noting that even normal perception involves some MTT, i.e. some
genuine awareness of objects outside the present. Both perception and memory
are delayed in terms of the occurrence of the relevant event and the experience of
that event. We never perceive, visually or otherwise, events contemporaneously
as they happen, since processing takes time.22 Perceptual experiences present the
past – how far into the past depends on how spatially distal the object is from
the perceiver and how long it takes to process the information received via the
senses. The light from stars can take billions of years to reach us, and we perceive
milliseconds into the past when we look at objects nearby. Temporal delay is not
simply an incidental feature of perception but also necessary for some attributes
of our experience. For example, the short delay between a sound being received
by the two ears when they are not equidistant from the source partly accounts for
our ability to detect the direction from which the sound emanated (Mather, 2016).
If temporal delay is a constant and necessary feature of perception, the temporal
delay of memory itself is not a distinguishing feature, although the cause of the
delay is distinct, i.e. storing and retrieving formemory vs. the travel and processing
of stimulus for perception.23
Wehave argued that there is a plausible case to bemade formemory as genuine
awareness of past events. However, issues for this view arise under particular
theories of memory, especially those that take memory to involve reconstruction.
Despite this, we argue that there is still room for our thesis under these views.
21Like Perrin, Martin (2001) lands on a direct representationalist account of recall experiences as
involving genuine awareness of the past, although he does not give an argument like the one
developed here. So, Debus (2008), Martin (2001), and Perrin (2016) endorse accounts on which
episodic recall experiences afford genuine awareness of the past.
22Predictive processing adds further complexity to this account. We discuss this alternative in
section 6.
23It is possible that neither memory nor perception should be viewed in the way proposed. How-
ever, this goes beyond the goals of this paper. We simply mean to argue that successful memory
can be considered as affording genuine awareness to the extent that successful perception can.
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5 Constructivist views of episodic memory
Modern theories claiming that memory is a reconstruction rather than a replay-
ing of past events pose a prima facie challenge to our interpretation of episodic
memory. According to some theorists, memory does not even require a causal
link to past events. If correct, would past recall still count as genuine awareness
of past events? We argue that even these theories of memory which appear most
contradictory to our view are in fact consistent with it.
What exactly is episodic memory? It can be contrasted with what is known
as ‘procedural memory’ in psychology (Anderson, 1976; Tulving, 1983; Winograd,
1972) or ‘know how’ in philosophy (Ryle, 1945), which involves skills or abilities.
Memory for facts is known as ‘propositional’ or ‘semantic memory’ (Quillian, 1968;
Tulving, 1972). Procedural and semantic memory are, for a good reason, sidelined
in this discussion since they do not give the rememberer access to the past qua
their own experienced past, and are ahistorical. The context in which these mem-
ories were experienced is not maintained as part of the memory. If this context is
carried over, then there is a separate, episodic memory. For example, remember-
ing where you were when you learned about the toxicity of vitamin A in a polar
bear liver involves both episodic and semantic memories. For this reason, we are
concerned with recollective, episodic or autobiographical memory, which involves
remembering personal events from a first person perspective (Brewer, 1986).
Historically, normally working episodic memory has been described as
giving us access to the past through the preservation of sense impressions
(Hume, 1739/2000) or internal representations that are later reactivated (Martin
& Deutscher, 1966). However, the view that memory simply replays past ex-
periences has been largely rejected. Memory is not simply stored information
which is then later retrieved (Martin, 2001). Rather, according to constructivists,
memory involves constructing “plausible representations of past events” (Robins,
2019, p. 2136) instead of simply replaying stored representations of those events
(see Michaelian, 2011; De Brigard, 2014). This constructive nature is evinced by
how memory often involves the entwining of multiple events and is “blended,
not laid down independently once and for all, and […] reconstructed rather
than reproduced” (Sutton, 1998, p. 2). Memory rebuilds past representations on
each recall (Michaelian, 2016a). Forgotten sections are filled in with memories of
separate events or confabulated, for example, by inference making or imagination.
De Brigard (2014) likewise argues that memory is a process in which mental
representations are optimised under probabilistic constraints. This brings together
both encoded data of previous experiences and, with the same optimisation algo-
rithms, fills the gaps where previous experience has not been encoded with infor-
mation about what probably happened. Sometimes, this information is an optimal
construction, but when there is deviation from optimality, this is what we con-
sider to be a misrepresentation or false memory. Sutton (2003) notes that despite
this turn from defining memories as accurate representation, this reconstruction
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process does not necessarily render memories false, and at the same time, it does
not entail that no memories can be classified as false. Rather, all memories, both
veridical and false, are constructed, and assessing memories as the former or the
latter requires greater nuance. Constructivists point out that reconstruction is nec-
essary because we never remember an event in its entirety, and yet our memory
is not usually experienced as being gappy.
One clear example of how memory can be both veridical and at the same
time reconstructed differently from the initial experience is when the perspective
switches, so that the event is viewed from a different angle (Rice & Rubin, 2009).
This observer perspective is commonly from a bird’s eye view. The original field
perspective is not represented accurately, which can be immediately determined
since that particular angle of perception would be physically impossible, but the
events portrayed in the memory are often sufficiently accurate to be considered a
true memory. Although this is only one example, under this view, reinterpretation
is the norm, not the exception.
Some theorists even deny that the purpose of memory is to give us knowledge
of past events. Another alternative is that memory is about life coherence. It
enables us to “produce a coherent life history” (Schechtman, 1994, p. 13). In this
view, memory is a narrative that provides the important purpose of informing us
of who we are as individuals. This not only incidentally but necessarily involves
biases and reconstructions.
While the aforementioned views describe remembering as involving reinter-
pretation of encoded data or stored memory traces, which can be more or less ac-
curate, others reject the view that such traces are a necessary element of veridical
memory altogether. Michaelian (2016a, 2016b) rejects “causalist” theories accord-
ing to which a causal connection with the event remembered is essential for an ex-
perience to be classified as successful remembering. Instead, three conditions need
to be met: accuracy, reliability and internality. Internality is what distinguishes
remembering from relearning, in which information that has been forgotten is re-
learned from an external source. This is not to say that causal factors, retention and
access of information are never the cause of any token memory, but rather they
are not the criterion. Michaelian (2016a, p. 10) says “simulationism is compatible
with the view that remembering often does involve retention: the simulationist’s
claim is that remembering does not necessarily involve retention, not that it neces-
sarily does not involve retention”. We could, for example, have a genuine accurate
memory that is generated by some other process, such as inference making, that
lacks any direct causal memory trace. So long as the process is reliable, comes to
an accurate interpretation of events and is internal, it is memory irrespective of
the process of memory generation.
Here, we do not aim to espouse the various strengths and weaknesses of these
competing views, but rather analyse whether our thesis is consistent with them.
Anti-causalist views will be the most challenging, however, we believe it can be
done.
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6 The constructivist challenge to a genuine
awareness account of memory
Constructivist and anti-causalist views threaten to undercut our central premise
that there is causal or informational dependence between a recall experience and
the remembered event (Sant’Anna &Michaelian, 2019, pp. 195–196). The construc-
tivist would suggest that any given memory depends on a blending of cognitive
features rather than simply such informational dependence. In the more extreme
case of the anti-causalist, the dependence on neural patterns that occurred during
the original experience is removed altogether, rejecting P3 of our argument, the
premise that synaptic tuning of the relevant memory depends on the original pat-
tern of activity which shaped it. If recall experiences are blended, or worse, if they
need not have causally originated at all in the remembered event, can they afford
genuine awareness of the past?
First, let us start with the more radical anti-causalist position. Anti-causalists
like Michaelian do not claim that no recall experiences are grounded in a causal-
informational link to the recalled event. Their claim is just that such a link is not
necessary for successful recall. Hence, a conciliatory approach is available. In line
with our argument from section 4, we allow that the content of causally-detached
recall experiences, when they occur, is merely intentional, but still hold that suc-
cessful recall experienceswhich do have a causal-informational link afford genuine
awareness.
One might worry that this conciliatory approach is unstable.24 If only some
successful recall experiences involve genuine awareness of the past and others do
not, what difference does genuine awareness make? Would it not be a simpler
theory to deny that any of the cases involve genuine awareness of the past? Our
response to this worry is that simple theories are only to be preferred when there is
no evidence providing greater support for the more complicated theory. We argue
that when taking into account the empirical evidence, it is not plausible to simply
claim that genuine awareness plays no role whatsoever. In line with our main ar-
gument from section 4, even if anti-causalism is true, some recall experiences still
do have causal-informational links to the recalled event and are still dependent on
the remembered event, and this dependence makes a difference for token memo-
ries. Specifically, this dependence puts us into contact with the recalled event, or
“brings it into consciousness”.
What about memories which retain some causal link to what is remembered,
but still involve distortion and reconstruction? We agree with Martin (2001, p.
282), who notes that “direct contact with the past is still consistent with the idea
that there is much fabrication in recall”. In support of this view, we highlight the
analogy between memory to perception. Since normal, successful perception can
itself be constructed or have a tenuous causal connection to the distal stimulus
24Thank you to a reviewer for this and the following suggestions.
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but still afford genuine awareness, these features of memory should not be seen to
disqualify it as affording genuine awareness. Let us consider this comparison with
perception in more detail.
According to Bayesian brain approaches, perception of the world arises from
unconscious inference making (Helmholtz, 1924/2005). This view rejects the as-
sumption that perceptual content is extracted from sensory stimulation. Rather,
the content of our perceptual experience involves “hypotheses” about events and
objects in the world (Gregory, 1980). Perception is a process of inference making
based on priors25 under the Bayesian framework, and these priors become more
relied upon when there is more ambiguity in the environment, say, in poor light-
ing (Kersten & Yuille, 2003). An influential solution to how Bayesian principles
can be applied to experience is the predictive processing framework of perception,
according to which perceptual content is a prediction of sensory input that is up-
dated when it comes into conflict with that input. A key element of perception, on
this view, is prediction error minimisation (Friston, 2003; Friston & Stephan, 2007;
Rao & Ballard, 1999) or free energy minimisation (Friston, 2010), which involves
the attempt to minimise the error between predictions about what should be per-
ceived and sensory inputs (Clark, 2013). Crucially, some theorists believe this is
all there is to perception (e.g. Hohwy, 2013, 2016). Metzinger (2009) similarly con-
siders the content of perception to be a transparent unified world model of the
present time. Perception, on this view, involves a complex interweaving of “short-
term memory and working memory, with recurrent loops in neural networks, and
with the binding of single events into larger temporal gestalts (often simply called
the psychological moment)” (Metzinger, 2009, p. 35).
According to these views, perceptual experience is distorted and constructed in
much the same way as constructivist views of episodic memory. Memory and per-
ception are both constructed in order to give us an informational link to the envi-
ronment, and these can be assessed for accuracy. If this constructive aspect of per-
ception does not preclude perception from affording genuine awareness (Drayson,
2018), the same applies for episodic memory.
Predictive processing views of perception also invite a second look at anti-
causalist views of episodic memory. On closer analysis, the anti-causalist view of
episodic memory is not so distinct from the interpretation of predictive processing
according to which perceptual content is just prediction constrained by sensations
(Friston & Stephan, 2007). This interpretation makes even successful perception
itself a kind of “controlled hallucination” (Clark, 2015, p. 14). By describing sen-
sory input as a constraint to rather than a cause of perception, Michaelian’s anti-
causalist description of memory is quite analogous. But if this merely constraint-
based nature of perception does not preclude it from affording us genuine aware-
ness of the environment, neither should it preclude successful recall from affording
genuine awareness of the past. We can still retain the kind of connection with the
real world required for genuine awareness via constraints imposed by the environ-
25The probability distribution based on previous input.
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ment. So long as the relevant experience, whether perceptual or recall, depends
on or is linked to the object or event, it provides genuine awareness of that object
or event, even if there is no causal link.
This analogy between the anti-causalist view of memory and perception as
“controlled hallucination” may not seem entirely apt. Even if sensory input is
merely a constraint on the perceptual predictions affording the content of our per-
ceptual experiences, sensory input still provides a sort of causal connection to the
world that the anti-causalist claims can be missing from memory. For example,
the anti-causalist might have in mind the following sort of case. Say the original
memory trace laid down during your perception of an event is lost via forgetting,
but later you see video that you took of the event. Watching the video lays down
new memory traces that are accurate of your original experience, and subsequent
recall experiences of the event are reconstructed by activating these new memory
traces.
In reply, we want to suggest that there might be instances of perception which
are analogous to even the most extreme causal-disconnection in the memory. As
aforementioned, higher ambiguity in sensory input means priors become more
relied upon than that sensory input. Does perception still afford genuine aware-
ness of a distal stimulus when it relies heavily, or even entirely, on priors? More
often than not, we do a good job at correctly inferring, based on priors, the distal
causes of our sensory input. We might still take a perceptual experience to involve
genuine awareness of its object if, say, the priors did a good job of representing
the world accurately through correct inference making in absence of the relevant
stimulus.
A good example of prediction outweighing sensory input in the case of ambi-
guity is the mask illusion, and relatedly, perception of faces. A widely accepted
explanation as to why it is nearly impossible for neurotypical individuals26 to see
the inside of a mask as hollow is because of our priors about seeing faces. Whether
it is convex or concave is underdetermined by the visual cues, but faces are almost
never experienced as hollow. Because of their salience and importance for process-
ing, both concave and convex masks are interpreted as being convex (Dima et al.,
2009; Gregory, 1980). It is well accepted that what we see is determined by both
retinal and several extra-retinal factors, with memory, arguably, being the main
contributing extra-retinal factor (Albright, 2012). One could say that the perceived
convexity of a mask or even a face is priors-driven rather than stimulus-driven
since the distinction between convex and concave is ambiguous. One can then in-
fer that perception of convex masks or normal faces is accurate perception in the
absence of disambiguating stimuli. These perceptions are reliable, in Michaelian’s
criteria, simply because faces and masks are usually convex.
However, one might argue that despite elements of perception being entirely
priors driven, perception of, say, an entire visual scene or event must involve some
direct causal link in order to be both veridical and reliable. Even ambiguous sen-
sory inputs provide some direct causal constraint. In contrast, memory of an entire
26Some individuals with schizophrenia do not see the illusion.
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event might be reliable in some other way – for example, being told about some-
thing you did as a child and “remembering” it accurately based on this telling of
the event plus some good imaginative work and inference making. However, the
view that a causal link is not part of the criterion of memory does not exclude the
possibility that this link is, in practice, necessary for most reliably accurate mem-
ories. Martin (2001, p. 282) notes that the important sense of memory as genuine
awareness would be “lost if episodic memory had no special status in an account
of our epistemic links with the past”. Nonetheless, if it turns out that causal con-
nectedness, or at least some informational link, is not a requirement of all reliable,
accurate episodic memories, we can fall back on the conciliatory approach out-
lined at the start of this section. We argue that there is a case for saying that even
causally-disconnected successful memories afford genuine awareness of the past,
but if this argument fails, the causally-connected ones at least still afford genuine
awareness.
7 The function challenge
Part of our response above was to claim that accurate tracking of the environment
may suffice for the kind of contact which makes the difference between the gen-
uine awareness of perception and the mere intentional content of hallucination,
even if this tracking is not achieved by robust causal links. Another challenge to
our view of memory is that the function of memory is not even to represent the
past accurately. Memory is a key aspect of the sense of self in theories of psycho-
logical continuity of personal identity (Parfit, 1971) and is important for our life
narrative or trajectory (Schechtman, 2011). Because of this, there are a variety of
biases that affect what and how we remember events. This is particularly obvious
regarding emotional salience, which can alter both the likelihood that an event
will be remembered and the associations related to these memories (Kensinger,
2009). We can then ask whether perception carries similar functions. It does seem
that salient factors can alter perception in a variety of ways. Reward and punish-
ment, for example, can affect what is perceived in binocular rivalry experiments in
which two different visual stimuli are presented to different eyes and perception
shifts back and forth between the two. Balcetis, Dunning, & Granot (2012) found
that after teaching participants to associate values to specific letters and numbers,
specifically a monetary prize as the reward for earning points, the stimulus with a
higher point value becomes dominant, i.e. participants are more likely to see that
stimulus first and for longer. This is just one way in which value biases perception
similarly to how biases affect memory.
There are many biases and potential functions to memory as there are to per-
ception, but we see this as no reason to reject the view that most memories involve
contact with recalled events. If under these views, there are some mental states
that do not accurately represent past events but should still be classed as memo-
ries, then we again adopt the conciliatory approach; these token memories are not
cases of genuine awareness of the past.
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8 Conclusion
We have argued that episodic memory enables genuine awareness of the past.
Memories are (at least sometimes) reactivated neural patterns that depend on and
repeat an original pattern of activity that occurred during the initial experience
of an item or event. Because of this, episodic recall experience involves genuine
awareness of the event that was originally experienced. We have argued that this
view is still applicable under theories of memory that appear, at first glance, to
be incompatible with it, namely constructivist and anti-causalist views. However,
particular token memories under such views may involve no causal link with the
past and thus may not afford genuine awareness of past events.
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